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A B S T R A C T
This article develops a new framework for understanding environment-conﬂict relations, on both
theoretical grounds and through a qualitative historical analysis of the links between water and conﬂict in
the states of Sudan and South Sudan. Theoretically, the article critiques the dominant emphases on
‘scarcity’, ‘state failure’ and ‘under-development’ within discussions of environmental security, and
proposes an alternative model of environment-conﬂict relations centring on resource abundance and
globally-embedded processes of state-building and development. Empirically, it examines three claimed
(or possible) linkages between water and conﬂict in the Sudans: over trans-boundary waters of the Nile;
over the links between internal resource scarcities and civil conﬂict; and over the internal conﬂict impacts
of water abundance and development. We ﬁnd that there exists only limited evidence in support of the ﬁrst
two of these linkages, but plentiful evidence that water abundance, and state-directed processes of
economic development and internal colonisation relating to water, have had violent consequences. We
conclude that analysts and policymakers should pay more attention to the impacts of resource abundance,
militarised state power and global political economic forces in their assessments of the potential conﬂict
impacts of environmental and especially climate change.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Mainstream academic and policy accounts of the relations
between environmental change and conﬂict, including the conﬂict
potential of global climate change, are usually organised around
three sets of ideas: ‘scarcity’, ‘state failure’ and ‘under-develop-
ment’. Scarce resources are envisaged as challenging livelihoods,
fomenting grievances and competition, and spurring civil and
perhaps even inter-state conﬂict. Weak state authority is held to
facilitate, or do little to mitigate, the development of these
dynamics. And widespread poverty and a low level of development
are equally thought to be crucial contextual factors, on the grounds
that resource scarcity primarily affects the lives of poor people in
poor countries. These motifs have not gone unchallenged, of
course. Scarcity discourse, in particular, has been extensively
critiqued on both theoretical and empirical grounds, with some
ﬁnding scant evidence of links between environmental scarcity
and conﬂict (esp. Theisen, 2008), and others calling attention to the
problematic political agendas associated with, and the negative* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1273 876694.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.01.008consequences of, scarcity framings (Leach and Mearns, 1996;
Mehta, 2010). Yet ‘scarcity’, ‘state failure’ and ‘under-development’
remain the dominant policy and academic ideas. And critical
scholarship on these themes has been more oriented to critiquing
these constructions, especially ‘scarcity’, than proposing alterna-
tive models of environment-conﬂict relations.
This article seeks to advance just such a new model, on both
theoretical grounds and through a qualitative historical analysis of
the links between water and conﬂict in the states of Sudan and
South Sudan. The two Sudans (or, prior to southern secession in
2011, the single state of Sudan) have long served as textbook cases
within environmental security thinking. Images and headlines of
drought, famine and conﬂict dominate Western public, and to a
degree expert, understandings the two countries. Both chronic and
environmental shock-induced water scarcities are often identiﬁed
as important contributory factors to their high levels of political
violence (Assal, 2006; Bromwich, 2009). And Sudan is regularly
portrayed as site of the world’s ﬁrst global climate change-induced
war, in the troubled western region of Darfur (Mazo, 2010, pp. 73–
86; Mjøs, 2007). Sudan generally and Darfur speciﬁcally are often
held up as providing paradigm-deﬁning evidence of our looming
future of climate change-induced conﬂicts. ‘Let Darfur stand as the
starkest of warnings about what the future could bring,’ claims one
report (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 2). Moreover, both of the Sudans are
J. Selby, C. Hoffmann / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 360–370 361regularly characterised as ‘failed’, ‘failing’, ‘fragile’ or ‘weak’ states
(Ellis, 2005), and as desperately under-developed (Keen, 2001),
these failings in turn being understood as important contextual or
contributory factors in their experiences of scarcity-induced
conﬂict. The Sudans thus serve as a perfect case for testing
mainstream environmental security (and speciﬁcally water and
climate security) thinking, and for suggesting an alternative model
of environment-conﬂict relations.
The article is structured as follows. Immediately below we
provide a cursory overview of contemporary environmental
conﬂict discourse; critique on theoretical grounds its overwhelm-
ing emphases on scarcity, state failure and under-development;
and outline an alternative model of environment-conﬂict relations.
We then brieﬂy summarise our case study methodology. Thereaf-
ter we turn to the Sudans, considering three different sets of
claimed (or possible) links between environmental change and
conﬂict: (1) over the trans-boundary resources of the Nile; (2) over
internal water scarcities; and (3) over internal water abundance
and projects of agricultural and water development. We ﬁnd that
there exists only limited historical evidence in support of the ﬁrst
two of these linkages, but plentiful evidence that water abundance,
and state-directed processes of economic development and
internal colonisation relating to water, have had violent con-
sequences. The conclusion expands on this core ﬁnding and also
considers the potential purchase of this model under future
circumstances of global climate change.
2. The environment and conﬂict revisited
The idea of ‘scarcity’ provides the central organising concept
within contemporary environmental conﬂict discourse, including
on the conﬂict potential of water stresses and global climate
change. Understood sometimes in Malthusian terms (as arising
when population growth and consumption approach natural
limits) and sometimes through the lens of neo-classical economics
(as an inherent property of all economic goods), scarcity is
assumed to generate frustration, competition, grievances, and in
turn, potentially, conﬂict. Thus the UN Secretary General has
recently claimed that, within the context of climate change,
[c]ompetition between communities and countries for scarce
resources, especially water, is increasing, exacerbating old security
dilemmas and creating new ones’ (Ban, 2011). Many scholars have
broadly concurred. The central thesis of the leading exponent of
post-Cold War environmental security discourse, Thomas Homer-
Dixon, is that ‘environmental scarcity causes violent conﬂict’
(1999, p. 93). Peter Gleick, leading authority on water and
international security, presents water’s scarcity as the primary
characteristic that makes it a likely ‘source of strategic rivalry’
(1993, p. 84). And the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
has concluded that climate change ‘may exacerbate resource
scarcities in developing countries,’ in turn potentially generating
‘scarcity disputes between countries, clashes between ethnic
groups, and civil strife and insurgency’ (2001, p. 950); and that
‘climate change may become a contributory factor to conﬂicts in
the future, particularly those concerning resource scarcity, for
example scarcity of water’ (2007, p. 443). More recent quantitative
scholarship has tended to ﬁnd only limited support for the
scarcity-conﬂict thesis (see e.g. Gleditsch, 2012; Johnson et al.,
2011 for overviews); and the mainstream concern with scarcity
has also been extensively critiqued by political ecologists on
theoretical, political and evidential grounds (e.g. Peluso and Watts,
2001; Benjaminsen, 2008). Nonetheless, the belief that scarcity can
cause or contribute to conﬂict, and will do so increasingly in future,
remains the core framing idea and reference point – even when
this is only a point of departure – within environmental conﬂict
debates.Alongside but secondary to this, most academic and policy
discourse on environmental conﬂict also places signiﬁcant
emphasis on institutional and economic factors as important
intervening or contextual causes of scarcity-related conﬂict.
Speciﬁcally, economic ‘under’ or ‘low’ development, and ‘failed’
or ‘weak’ statehood, are routinely depicted as pivotal in
determining whether resource scarcities generate conﬂict or not.
In some academic accounts, ‘constrained economic productivity’
and ‘disrupted institutions’ are considered effects of environmen-
tal scarcity, and thus important pathways to conﬂict (Homer-
Dixon, 1999, pp. 81–103). In others, by contrast, these institutional
and economic factors are viewed as independent variables which
typically precede but then interact with scarcity crises (Baechler,
1999, pp. 41, 103; Kahl, 2006, pp. 24–26). For most, low economic
development is such a crucial variable that the analysis of
environmental security challenges can be restricted, a priori, to
poor countries: as Nordas and Gleditsch observe, this assumed
connection between environmental conﬂict and poverty ‘is not a
point of great controversy in the literature’ (2007, p. 635). Likewise,
state failure, weakness and contraction are typically viewed as key.
This is especially the case within policy discourse (e.g. CNA
Corporation, 2007, p. 44; UK Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2008, p. 18), but also
holds true of much of the best academic analysis: Barnett and
Adger observe, for instance, that ‘when states contract . . . violent
conﬂict [over scarce resources] is more likely’ (2007, p. 647). The
basic assumption operative here is that the environmental conﬂict
problematique is to a signiﬁcant degree caused or mediated by
political and economic weaknesses that are internal to non-
Western states.
For the purposes of this article, there are ﬁve problems with the
above that need highlighting. First, the widespread assumption
that environmental conﬂicts should be analysed through the lens
of ‘scarcity’, when other resource conﬂicts are generally seen as
arising from ‘abundance’ (Koubi et al., 2013), is paradoxical and
indeed ﬂawed. Within the extant literature on the political
economy of civil wars, resource ‘abundance’ is generally seen as
the key variable, the high prevalence of diamonds, oil, and other
non-renewable resources being closely linked to conﬂicts, in Sub-
Saharan Africa in particular (e.g. Collier and Hoefﬂer, 2005; Fearon,
2005). This is puzzling: the mechanism linking rare minerals and
non-renewables with conﬂict is held to be the ‘resource curse’ of
‘abundance’, while the condition linking water–the most abundant
renewable resource on the planet–with conﬂict is thought to be
‘scarcity’. This latter linkage is typically justiﬁed on the grounds
that disruptions in the availability of environmental resources
such as water can contribute to economic decline, social
discontent, competition and in turn conﬂict–a causal chain which
is theoretically plausible, if often contested. Even if it is valid,
however, water could also be associated with conﬂict through
abundance. The resource curse literature typically argues that local
abundance can lead to conﬂict by creating incentives for parties to
engage in conﬂict, by providing the state and especially rebels with
the ﬁnancial means to sustain conﬂict, and/or by weakening state
institutions and transforming state-society relations (e.g. Collier
and Hoefﬂer, 2005; Fearon, 2005). There is little reason, in
principle, why these or some other abundance-related causal
dynamics could not also apply to water.
Second, the assumption that some resource conﬂicts are
associated with ‘scarcity’, whilst others are caused by ‘abundance’,
is theoretically incoherent–for the simple reason that scarcity and
abundance are relational concepts, which, like the terms ‘master’
and slave’, only make sense in relation to one another. Approached
thus, ‘scarcity’ does not refer to an objectively small quantum of
resources, but instead to a circumstance in which some individuals
or groups have less than others (i.e. socially), or than they have
in other places (i.e. spatially), or than they had at other times (i.e.
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resource curse of diamonds has often been associated with civil
war in the likes of Angola and Sierra Leone–but local ‘abundance’ in
such countries only exists relative to global ‘scarcity’, and to this
extent all precious gem and mineral-related conﬂicts must be as
much about the latter as the former. Indeed, the illusion that
‘scarcity’ and ‘abundance’ are discrete variables is only sustained
by a state-centric political imaginary and the quantitative datasets
that accompany it. Thus the challenge is not so much to understand
whether it is resource scarcity, or abundance, which is most
associated with conﬂict; but instead to treat these two concepts as
essentially paired–‘scarcity-abundance’–and as referring to rela-
tive differences across society, space and time, and to investigate
whether and how these relative differences are, or might become,
associated with conﬂict.
Third, there are grounds for thinking that it is not the relative
scarcity or abundance of particular environmental resources, but
rather their relative economic and political value, which is the
major determinant of their conﬂict potential. As already noted,
within the existing literature non-renewable resources are often
linked to conﬂict through the mechanism of abundance, while
renewable environmental resources such as water are usually
analysed through the lens of scarcity (Koubi et al., 2013). But the
high conﬂict potential of for instance diamonds does not
essentially lie in their abundance, so much as in their high value.
Equally, the intimate links between oil and military conﬂict are
above all rooted in the former’s economic and political value, oil
being both the mainstay of global mass consumer society, and a
vital source of, or potential route to, wealth and power for producer
state elites and the various worldwide economic and political
interests linked to them (especially in the oil, ﬁnancial and military
production sectors). In most contexts, environmental resources
are, by contrast, of relatively low economic and political value:
water, for instance, is generally not a route to wealth and power
(Selby, 2005a). It is arguably essentially for this reason that there
have been no modern inter-state ‘water wars’ (Wolf, 1998): within
the context of contemporary global capitalism, environmental
resources like water are just not of sufﬁcient value to be a priority
for economic and political elites (Selby, 2005a).
Fourth, academic and policy discourse on scarcity (or abun-
dance, in the resource curse literature) is almost always premised
on a mechanistic and geographically deterministic understanding
of resource conﬂict. The point here is not simply, pace Gleditsch
et al., that most conﬂicts are not ‘over some type of resource
perceived as scarce’ (2006, p. 362), or even that conﬂicts are
typically caused by various historically and socially speciﬁc
political, ideological, economic and identity factors that go well
beyond resource availability and distribution. Just as signiﬁcantly,
these non-resource factors structure how resources are
approached and valued. The extant literature almost always
analyses whether and how environmental changes (e.g. sudden or
secular changes in precipitation) or increases in demand (from
population growth or increased per capita consumption) deter-
mine or contribute to conﬂict. But this overlooks the possibility
that resource-related conﬂicts can occur without any change in, or
irrespective of, supply–demand balances, for instance through the
rise of new ideologies, policies or political and economic structures
which result in the resources in question being deemed more
valuable and conﬂict-worthy than hitherto. For example, repeated
US and UK military interventions in Middle Eastern oil states have
not been rooted in sudden or secular changes in the availability of
oil, but in speciﬁc political and economic interests and strategies.
Equally, ‘blood diamond’ conﬂicts have not been structured by
changes in the prevalence of diamonds, but rather by the
consistently high value ascribed to them by Western consumers
under the inﬂuence of De Beers and the worldwide advertisingindustry. If and when scarcity-abundance is an important causal
factor within conﬂicts, this is not because it mechanically
determines behaviour, but to the extent that it is deemed and
interpreted as important by parties to conﬂict, within the context
of global political economic structures.
Equivalent problems bedevil the widespread emphases on state
failure and under-development. The idea of ‘state failure’ has been
widely critiqued as an essentially normative rather than analytical
concept, that is more a product of various post-Cold War Western
security interests than a tool of rigorous political analysis (e.g. Call,
2008; Logan and Preble, 2010). As an analytical tool, however, its
central emphasis and value is in pointing to the problems that
emanate from weak and disintegrating state institutions, that is,
from a lack of sovereign state control over populations and territory.
There are at least two problems here. Firstly, many of the gravest
insecurities in the global South arise not just from state weakness,
but rather from militarised state strategies and processes of state-
building and internal colonisation which in the contemporary global
South, as previously in Europe, have necessarily involved wide-
spread violence and dispossession (Stavrianakis and Selby, 2012).
Secondly, many of these insecurities and state strategies have
important international and geopolitical dimensions, rather than
being mere internal characteristics of the ‘failed states’ in question.
To illustrate from an earlier historical era, the devastating climate-
related famines experienced across India, China, Brazil and
elsewhere during the late nineteenth century were, in their political
dimensions, essentially products of British imperial power and
doctrine, not weak local governance (Davis, 2002). The role of
aggressive state institutions and strategies in creating or exacerbat-
ing resource insecurities is sometimes recognised within the
environmental security literature: Kahl (2006), for instance,
analyses both ‘state failure’ and ‘state exploitation’ resource
conﬂicts. But most academic and virtually all policy discourse
remains inattentive to these exploitative state and international
dimensions of resource-related conﬂicts.
Sixth and ﬁnally, the emphasis on ‘under-development’ as a
cause of scarcity conﬂicts is problematic for similar reasons. The
under-development thesis draws heavily on recent econometric
research on civil wars which has repeatedly concluded that
poverty and low development are closely correlated with civil war
(e.g. Murshed, 2002). There are three problems here, each of which
also applies to the environmental security literature. Firstly, such
claims about the correlation between poverty and violence are
historically myopic: yes, civil wars since the 1980s have been
overwhelmingly concentrated in the global South, most notably
Sub-Saharan Africa, but this has not been the case in earlier
historical eras, and thus need not be in the future (see e.g. Halperin,
2004). There is thus no necessary a priori reason why environment
and resource-related conﬂicts should be limited to, or emanate
from, poor states. Secondly, against the assumption that poverty
and low development cause conﬂict, it has historically been the
case that processes of economic and social development have
themselves been inherently conﬂictual, and inherently violent.
Indeed, both historically (Moore, 1967) and in the contemporary
South (Cramer, 2006), war has had formative productive impacts
on, and been an abiding characteristic of, ‘development’. Moreover,
thirdly, under-development is never merely an internal character-
istic of poor states and societies, but a product also of their
structural positioning and insertion into a highly uneven and
hierarchical world economy. What this suggests is at least the
theoretical possibility that environment-related conﬂicts may be
caused, not by local and internal development deﬁcits, but instead
by processes of development that are internationally structured, or
even sanctioned.
These six lines of critique suggest an alternative model for
understanding the relations between the environment and
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relations and processes (the social, geographical and temporal
relations between ‘scarcity’ and ‘abundance’; and processes of state-
building and development) rather than objective conditions, levels
or variables (e.g. levels of scarcity or of development) which are the
key to understanding the links between the environment and
conﬂict. Linked to this is a second premise: that these relations and
processes are not deﬁned or limited by state boundaries, and
cannot be understood through the analytical lens of state-
centrism, but instead operate at multiple local, national, interna-
tional and global scales, and are also multi-scalar in their causes.
Building on this, our hypotheses track the six lines of critique
above: ﬁrst, that relative local environmental abundance is more
intimately associated with conﬂict than local environmental
scarcity; second, that such local abundance only assumes
importance relative to ‘scarcities’ elsewhere; third, that it is the
relative political and economic value of different environmental
resources, rather than their abundance or scarcity, which is the
major determinant of their conﬂict potential; fourth, that it is
political processes and economic dynamics, rather than changes in
resource availability, which are the main proximate determinants
of environment-related conﬂict; and ﬁnally, that the most
important such dynamics are local processes of state-building
and development, which are in turn embedded in broader
geopolitical and global political-economic relations.
3. Methodology
To test these hypotheses, we undertake below a qualitative
historical analysis of water-conﬂict relations in a single (large) case
study area, Sudan. We focus on water speciﬁcally since, of all
environmental resources, it is water which is most often associated
with scarcity-induced conﬂict. Similarly, we focus on Sudan since it
is often viewed as a textbook case of environmental security, as
indicated above. Theoretically, our analysis is principally informed
by historical materialist scholarship in International Relations
(Halliday, 1994; Rupert and Smith, 2002) and Geography (Harvey,
1996, 2009), though it also owes much to work in political ecology
(Peluso and Watts, 2001). In line with these approaches, we view
development and state formation as inherently conﬂict – laden and
violent processes – in Sudan as elsewhere, including historically in
Europe (Ayers, 2010; Tilly, 1985). Also in line with these
approaches, as well as our critical comments above, our method
is intentionally qualitative: the analysis of multi-scalar processes
and relations demands just such a method, and cannot coherently
be pursued through a quantitative analysis of correlations between
supposedly distinct ‘variables’. We test three sets of claimed (or
possible) links between water and conﬂict in Sudan: (1) over trans-
boundary waters of the Nile; (2) over the links between internal
Sudanese resource scarcities and civil conﬂict; and (3) over the
internal conﬂict impacts of water abundance and development.
The analysis draws upon ﬁeldwork conducted in South Sudan
during 2011 and 2012, plus existing literatures on Sudanese
history, political economy and the environment. Of this existing
literature, we should mention in particular the signiﬁcant parallels
between our analysis and that of Verhoeven (2011b). However,
whereas Verhoeven’s main concern is to critique mainstream
environment-conﬂict narratives as they have been invoked in
relation to Sudan, we aim here to go a step further and offer an
original positive account of environment-conﬂict relations that is
relevant not only to Sudan, but also beyond.
4. Scarcity and competition on the Nile
The claim that the limited water resources of the River Nile are
subject to increasing pressures and competition, leading togrowing strategic rivalry and potentially to inter-state conﬂict,
is a staple of the water security literature. Indeed, within much of
this literature, the prospects for conﬂict over the Nile are discussed
more than any other case (e.g. Gleick, 1993; ICA, 2012). This
concern about Nile geopolitics is founded on three main factors:
the high levels of population and economic growth within the Nile
basin states, which are deemed likely to increase pressure on
supplies; the extreme dependence of the downstream riparians,
especially Egypt, on transboundary Nile ﬂows; and the absence of
any basin-wide water management regime amongst the eleven
(including South Sudan) Nile riparians. Egypt, in particular, faces
an undoubtedly challenging situation, being 97% dependent on
transboundary ﬂows (FAO, 2009), and facing the prospect of 500
cubic metres/capita/year (m3/year) water availability by 2025,
according to its Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation
(Moussa, 2012; MWRI, 2010) – which, by the most widely used
measure of water stress, would place it in the category of ‘absolute
scarcity’ (Falkenmark, 1989). Securing the Nile is often said to be
Egypt’s primary consideration in its relations with Sudan and
upstream riparians and, indeed, Nile state leaders have repeatedly
raised the prospect of war over access to it. President Sadat
observed, for instance, that ‘we depend upon the Nile 100% in our
life, so if anyone, at any moment, seeks to deprive us of our life, we
shall never hesitate to go to war’ (Waterbury, 1979, p. 78). Egyptian
Foreign Minister Boutros Ghali declared in 1990 that ‘the next war
in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ – an unfortunate
statement not only in its assumption that water is extra-political,
but also in its timing, just before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (Selby,
2005b, p. 339). In 2010, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
accused Egypt of supporting rebel forces in his country, in order to
prevent it from developing the Nile (Malone, 2010). And just prior
to his overthrow, Egyptian President Morsi implied that Cairo
might respond militarily to Ethiopian dam construction, threaten-
ing that if the Nile ‘diminishes by one drop, then our blood is the
alternative’ (Verhoeven, 2013).
Yet for all this rhetoric, post-colonial Sudan has not been a site of,
or party to, any signiﬁcant trans-boundary conﬂict over the Nile,
despite accounting for over 60% of the river’s total basin area. Hydro-
political relations between Sudan and Egypt have historically been
characterised much more by cooperation than conﬂict. To this day,
these relations remain governed by the terms of the 1959 Nile
Waters Agreement, which codiﬁed Sudanese and Egyptian Nile
allocations, sanctioned the construction of the Aswan High Dam in
Egypt plus the Roseries Dam in Sudan, and established a Permanent
Joint Technical Commission to oversee the coordinated manage-
ment and development of the river (UAR/Sudan, 1959). Moreover,
Sudan’s actual utilisation remains well below its annual allocation of
18.5 billion m3 (annual abstraction from the Nile varies between 10
and 16 bm3/year: Hamad, 1998; Omer, 2007, p. 2070). Sudan is
currently engaged in an ambitious dam-building programme, which
may bring its average utilisation close to this 1959 allocation
(Verhoeven, 2011a, p. 19). However, all Sudanese dam-building
activity has been explicitly or implicitly approved by Egypt (Swain,
2011, p. 699; Taha, 2010, p. 196). Indeed, rather than trying to
prevent increased Sudanese utilisation, Egypt is actively participat-
ing in the expansion of Sudanese agriculture, through its ‘African
farms’ strategy (Ali, 2011; MALR, 2012). Of course, this hydro-
political cooperation is between Egypt and Sudan alone, excluding
upstream riparians; and even this bilateral ‘cooperation’ may be
considered an instance of Egyptian ‘hydro-hegemony’, a means
through which Egypt maintains institutionalised hegemony over the
Nile (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Nonetheless, it remains the case
that Egyptian-Sudanese water relations have not been marked by
any signiﬁcant, let alone violent, conﬂict.
Equally, Nile waters have not been a key issue, or source of
dispute, within the Sudanese peace process. The 260 page-long
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issues, and accounts of the three years of negotiations underpin-
ning the Agreement suggest that the Nile barely ﬁgured at all
(Johnson, 2011; Young, 2012). Under the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, Nile water management remained under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the national government (GoS and SPLM/A,
2005: Chapter II, Part 5, Schedule A: 33). Similarly, water issues
did not receive any great time or attention during the 2005–2011
interim phase of the peace process, and have not featured
prominently in post-referendum negotiations (ICG, 2011; UNSC,
2011). Indeed, next to the other outstanding post-secession issues
– ﬁnal border demarcation, oil revenue sharing, the status of
Abyei, citizenship, and population return, as well as the military
conﬂict in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states – water appears to
have been very far from a priority. A conjunction of three factors
probably lies behind this. Firstly, the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement’s deﬁnition of Nile water management as Khartoum’s
competence, plus the limited attention paid to water issues since
then, reﬂects the North’s status quo interests in maintaining and
perhaps extending its control over the Nile (Granit et al., 2011, p.
25). Second, there is little immediate demand for increased
utilisation of the Nile in South Sudan: almost all agricultural
production there is rain-fed; there were no functional pump
irrigation projects in the South when the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement was concluded in 2005 (Salman, 2011, p. 161); major
abstraction of Nile waters remains years away; and other issues,
especially regarding oil revenues and security, were for obvious
reasons deemed more immediate priorities in laying the founda-
tions for a new state. Thirdly, the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement may have deemed it sensible to delay discussion of the
Nile given the issue’s potential to complicate relations with other
Nile riparians and even jeopardise the peace process (Salman,
2011, pp. 161–162). As it happens, these external actors’ hydro-
security concerns have not been major sources of dispute within
the peace process. Egypt was often said to be hostile to the idea of
southern secession, in large part for hydro-political reasons (e.g.
ICG, 2010, pp. 10–11; Johnson, 2003, p. 43). However, in the event
Egypt supported the South’s secession after South Sudanese
President Salva Kiir, keen to warm Cairo to the idea of
independence, provided assurances that Egyptian water supplies
would not be affected (Wikileaks, 2010). Egypt has since
developed good political and water relations with independent
South Sudan, building on its long-established colonial and post-
colonial expertise on the region’s hydrology (Interview, 2011a,
2011b). Without idealising these water relations – which involve
hydro-hegemonic ‘control through cooperation’ – it is nonethe-
less evident that Sudan’s partition has not led to, or involved,
water scarcity-related conﬂicts.
Beyond these Sudan-speciﬁc issues, caution is also due on the
overall validity of Nile scarcity discourse. For all the talk of looming
water scarcity, there has been no average decline in Nile ﬂow
through Sudan since the 1960s, no decline in the water level of
Lake Nasser, and no decline in the volume of water released into
Egypt through the High Aswan Dam. Indeed, during the ten years
2000–2010, an average 60.8 bm3/year were released through the
High Aswan Dam (Abdel-Latif and Yacoub, 2011, pp. 89–90) – well
in excess of the 55.5 bm3/year allocated to Egypt under the Nile
Waters Agreement. Egypt continues to expand its irrigated
agriculture, notably in the Toshka, East Owainat, Darb al-Araba’in
and As-Salam Canal projects (Barnes, 2012, p. 518). Future
population and agricultural expansion in Egypt, and any equivalent
development in Ethiopia and other upstream riparians, will of
course place greater pressure on Nile waters. But there is no
evidence as yet of scarcity imposing limits on utilisation and
development, let alone evidence of such scarcities generating, or
contributing to, trans-boundary conﬂicts.5. Scarcity and civil conﬂict in Sudan
Parallel to this questionable discourse of trans-boundary
conﬂict on the Nile are the frequent claims that internal water
scarcities within Sudan are already generating or contributing to
civil violence. International and Sudanese actors alike have
regularly identiﬁed such linkages, especially in relation to Darfur.
In the UK alone, the Ministry of Defence (DCDC, 2010, p. 106), a
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (Huhne, 2011),
and leading think tanks (Mazo, 2010) and NGOs (Christian Aid,
2007), amongst others, have all interpreted conﬂict in Darfur as
caused or compounded by water stresses. In North America,
Thomas Homer-Dixon has done likewise (Homer-Dixon, 2007), as
have Jeffrey Sachs, Professor of Economics at Columbia University
(Sachs, 2006, 2005), former US Vice President Gore (2006), and
leading academic analysts of Sudanese politics (de Waal, 2007a;
Mamdani, 2009). Ban has not only described the Darfur conﬂict as
beginning ‘as an ecological crisis, arising in part from climate
change’ (Ban, 2007), but has also asserted that ‘if you don’t deal
with the issue of water in Darfur . . . then there will be no solution
at all’ (Hokanson, 2007) – a verdict corroborated by Ibrahim
Gambari, head of the African Union/UN mission in Darfur, who
contends that ‘water scarcity . . . imperil[s] our common efforts to
achieve peace and stability in Darfur’ (UNAMID, 2011). Sudan’s
President Bashir (Tisdall, 2011) and Foreign Minister Ali Karti
(SUNA, 2009) have both explained the Darfur war as a product of
climate-change induced water scarcities, Bashir’s account being
typical: ‘What happened in Darfur, ﬁrst of all, was a traditional
conﬂict taking place from the colonial days. Under all (previous)
national governments, there were tribal conﬂicts in Darfur,
because of the frictions between the shepherds and the farmers.
These kinds of frictions increased because of climate change and
the dry weather which also increased the movement of people and
herds, which led to more friction.’ Such linkages have also been
drawn in relation to South Sudan. For example, one commentator
claims that ‘most of the conﬂicts which have plagued Southern
Sudan’ since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ‘are water
access related’ (Luoi, 2010), while South Sudan’s Minister of Labour
has claimed, speaking at a reconciliation conference between
groups from Lakes and Warrap states, that ‘accessibility to water is
the main problem’ [sic] (Mayoum, 2010). Most such discourse on
Sudan is predicated on a similar set of claims or assumptions: that
internal Sudanese water scarcities and attendant processes of
desertiﬁcation are a source of and to some degree correlated with
conﬂicts; that these scarce water resources are principally fought
over by competing pastoralists and farmers; that such conﬂicts are
also products of, or are compounded by, subsistence livelihoods,
low development and weak state control; and often, that the water
scarcities are partly caused by anthropogenic climate change.
There are three sets of problems with such claims. Firstly, they
receive only the thinnest support from, and in some cases are
contradicted by, the actual record of recent environmental change
in Sudan. Consider ﬁrst Darfur, which has been the primary focus of
such claims. The Darfur war broke out in 2003, with the violence
being at its height between then and 2005. Yet during this three
year period, Darfur experienced above average rainfall (Kevane and
Gray, 2008; UNEP, 2008, pp. 8, 11). Moreover, rainfall levels were
not gradually ‘declining’ prior to 2003; to the contrary, rainfall
levels during the 1990s and early 2000s were generally above the
thirty year average, with no major droughts after 1990 (Kevane
and Gray, 2008, p. 4). This rainfall evidence is corroborated by
evidence of a greening of Darfur (and the Sahel beyond) since the
early 1990s which is visible through satellite imagery (Brown,
2010; Herrmann et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2005). Darfur was not
witness to ‘desertiﬁcation’ prior to the war (UNEP, 2007) – this
notion in any case being a problematic simpliﬁcation (Swift, 1996;
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the drought’ (Ban, 2007). Therefore, if precipitation changes and
resulting vegetative transformations did have an impact on the
Darfur war, the crucial factor must either have been the relative
abundance post-1990 (a possibility for which for which we know
of no evidence) or relative scarcities in the preceding decades, with
a decade-plus time-lag to the war itself. Indeed, the obvious case of
simultaneity between water scarcity and conﬂict onset in Sudan is
not provided by the Darfur war, but the 1983–2005 civil war – but
there is no suggestion in the existing literature that drought was a
factor in this war’s outbreak.
Just as water scarcity and conﬂict in Sudan have not been
temporally correlated, so equally there is no clear spatial
correlation between the two. During the Darfur war, the worst
violence took place in areas of relatively good rainfall, along the
southern and western fringes of the Jebel Marra highlands, and
between there and the border with Chad – areas with ‘amongst the
richest agricultural lands in Sudan’ (Mamdani, 2009, p. 10; see: US
Department of State, 2004 for location of destroyed villages).
Indeed, considering Sudan as a whole, the most perennial violence
in the ﬁfty plus years since independence has been in the states of
southern Sudan – areas with the highest rainfall levels. It is also
worth noting that, while there are of course huge internal
differences in precipitation and water availability, Sudan as a
whole is not water-scarce: total precipitation volume per capita in
Sudan is over ﬁve times that in the UK, while total renewable water
resources per capita are estimated at over 60% of the UK level
(calculated from FAO, 2012a, 2012b). Risk analysts have ranked
Sudan as 93rd or ‘low risk’ for water scarcity (Maplecroft, 2011).
A second problem with claims that internal water scarcities
have caused conﬂict in the Sudans is that they rest upon
stereotypical and outdated assumptions about Sudanese liveli-
hoods and society. Consider Darfur, once again. In water scarcity
readings of the Darfur war, it is thought that drought caused (or
signiﬁcantly contributed to) conﬂict by challenging traditional
subsistence livelihoods, leading to migration from areas of
environmental stress, and to heightened conﬂict amongst nomadic
pastoralists, and between them and sedentary farmers (Ban, 2007;
Faris, 2007). At least two assumptions are operative here: that
Darfur’s ‘traditional’ economy and society are utterly dominated
and determined by the availability of water; and equally, that this
traditionalism – Darfur’s low level of development – was a crucial
intervening variable between (claimed) water scarcities and the
descent into war. Both of these premises are mistaken, however.
Far from being merely ‘traditional’, contemporary livelihoods
across the Sudans are hybrid, dynamic, globally integrated and
arguably therefore also distinctly ‘modern’. The subsistence tribal
peasant no longer exists in Darfur, and has not done for decades (de
Waal, 1989, p. 55). Moreover, contrary to the oft-invoked
distinction between ‘nomads’ and ‘settled farmers’, today nearly
all farmers raise livestock, whilst nearly all pastoralists cultivate
crops (Young and Osman, 2005, p. 10). Both livestock and crop
production are heavily commercialised and export-oriented. While
crops used to be Sudan’s major export commodity, the livestock
sector has recently experienced dramatic growth ﬁgures, making
Sudan the leading livestock exporter in the region (Young and
Osman, 2005, p. 52). This, in turn, was a direct result of the state-
led liberalisation of the sector that began with the replacement of
the parastatal Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation with
commercial livestock banks in 1992 (UNEP, 2012, p. 19). Farming
practices continuously change and adapt, in response to assorted
economic and environmental variables. Moreover, rural liveli-
hoods in Darfur and across the Sudans are not solely dependent on
local production and therefore water, but equally on remittances
(especially from Libya, Saudi Arabia and other oil producer states:
Young and Osman, 2005, pp. 83–108; Young et al., 2007)international aid (Sudan ranks amongst the largest recipients of
overseas aid, most of it in the form of humanitarian aid, especially
to Darfur, see: Poole, 2011), and public sector employment,
especially in the security sector (one state salary in South Sudan
being reported to maintain 30 people: Environment Water Security
Workshop 2012).
Of course, the Sudans rank near the foot of most international
development indicators, and Darfur is a relatively peripheral area
within northern Sudan: to this extent, conﬂict in Darfur is broadly
correlated with under-development. But not only with this, since
the Darfur war also coincided with the early years of Sudan’s oil
boom. Oil exports from 1999 onwards spurred average annual GDP
growth of 6.75% from 2000 to 2003, compared with only 2.7% in the
preceding 20 years (IMF, 2009). On the back of this oil-led growth,
during the early 2000s there were signiﬁcant increases in
government revenues and expenditure, in the size of the
agricultural sector, and in both international arms procurement
and domestic military production (Patey, 2010; ICG, 2002).
Whether there was any causal relationship between these
developments and the war in Darfur, we cannot say. But this at
least suggests that the Darfur war was as much correlated with
processes of development, as its dearth.
Land disputes, migration and challenges to pastoralist liveli-
hoods have all been widely recognised as signiﬁcant contributors
to political violence in Darfur and beyond (e.g. Assal, 2009; Unruh,
2012). However, none of these have been solely or even mainly
rooted in either water scarcity or low development, but rather in a
combination of colonial and post-colonial development practices.
The British colonial era left a legacy of highly uneven land relations,
in which contestation over property relations between tribes was
aggravated, with some remaining dependent on access to others’
land and water: this applies, for instance, to the Northern Reizegat,
who played such a pivotal role in the Darfur war, constituting the
bulk of the Janjawid militia (Mamdani, 2009). More recently,
appropriative and conﬂict-ridden processes of development have
involved, inter alia, the conversion of open rangelands into
agricultural land, including irrigated land along seasonal rivers;
the enclosure of both farmland and pastures, and the denial of open
access to and free movement through these lands; and increased
stock sizes – all of which have exacerbated both pressures on the
environment and the aforementioned colonial legacies (Ayers,
2010; Barnett and Abdelkarim, 1987). Khartoum-led administra-
tive reforms have also led to a decline of traditional conﬂict
mechanisms, especially regarding land tenure (Suliman, 2010, p.
142). Next to these developments, drought has been a secondary
and passing – though during particular periods crucial – factor.
Poor rains during the 1970s and 1980s challenged existing
livelihood strategies right across the Sahel, leading entire
communities to migrate southwards, and contributing, perhaps
decisively, to socio-economic changes in Darfur. However, even
allowing for this, drought has not just been a determinant,
compelling communities to migrate and change livelihoods:
drought has also created opportunities. During the 1980s, some
groups in Darfur migrated southwards not so much to escape
drought and scarcity, but to access abundant pastures effectively
‘opened up’ by the southwards retreat of the tsetse ﬂy (de Waal,
2007b). Equally, some groups, most notably the relatively wealthy
Zaghawa, have migrated primarily during years of more plentiful
rainfall (de Waal, 2007b). Neither land disputes, migration nor
what Mamdani calls ‘the crisis of nomadism across the entire
Sahelian belt’ (Mamdani, 2009, p. 211) are rooted essentially in
water scarcity, or tradition and under-development, but rather in
the violent contradictions of modernisation and development.
In addition to this, thirdly, water scarcity-conﬂict discourse on
Sudan is premised on misunderstandings of the role of the state
and elites in Sudanese politics, including the state’s and Riverine
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is often simply elided within scarcity-conﬂict discourse on Sudan,
as if conﬂict were an automatic and reﬂexive product of scarcity,
irrespective of political agency. Thus the aforementioned UNEP
report concludes that ‘there is a very strong link between land
degradation, desertiﬁcation and conﬂict in Darfur’ despite admit-
ting elsewhere that it had chosen ‘not to investigate in detail the
social and political aspects of conﬂicts in Sudan, focusing instead
on their environmental dimensions’ (UNEP, 2007, pp. 8, 73). Where
politics is discussed within this discourse, it is primarily in terms of
the absence of political agency and authority – that is, weak or
failing statehood – not its decisive presence. For instance, in its
most recent discussion of global strategic trends, the UK Ministry
of Defence not only characterises conﬂict in Darfur as ‘an example
of how climate change may affect weak states,’ but also restricts its
discussion of the role of the Sudanese state to the observation that
it ‘lacked the necessary infrastructure and resources to respond to
the crisis’ (DCDC, 2010, p. 106).
Yet contrary to such claims, the Darfur war was essentially a
brutal counter-insurgency operation, launched and ﬁnanced by the
government in Khartoum, and conducted by a combination of
Sudanese army, intelligence and air force units, and paramilitary
Janjawid brigades (who far from being independent of the state,
often wore army uniforms, often operated in the company of
regular army units, and would regularly undertake their attacks
immediately after Sudanese Air force bombing raids: Prunier,
2005). The initial insurgency was not merely local either:
politically, it was the product of Bashir’s ‘Palace Revolt’ and
‘breakdown of elite accommodation’ within the NCP’s clientelistic
networks (Roessler, 2011a, p. 45) which in effect substituted a ‘civil
war risk for coup risk’ (Roessler, 2011b, p. 302; also Gallab, 2008);
whilst militarily, Darfur’s rebel movements received signiﬁcant
political and military support from the principal national opposi-
tion, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement. The Darfur
conﬂict was also signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by Cold War era regional
legacies, notably political crisis in the Chad and Gadafﬁ’s pan-
Africanism – making the Darfur war not only political but geo-
political (e.g. Mamdani, 2009, pp. 213–220). The Darfur war, in
sum, was a national and regional rather than merely local conﬂict,
the most signiﬁcant roots of which lay 1000 km away from the
burning villages of West Darfur, on the banks of the Nile. And it was
a conﬂict in which the Sudanese state was the central agent of
violence. The Darfur war was not caused by scarcity, was as much
associated with development as with under-development, and was
as much about state power as state failure.
6. Relative abundance, development and conﬂict
By contrast with this limited evidence of scarcity-induced
violent conﬂict, there is clear historical evidence in Sudan of links
between relative water abundance and development, and ensuing
violence. Indeed, some of the most violent episodes in Sudan’s
troubled history have involved attempts to capture water
resources and water-rich lands, for agricultural (and more broadly
socio-economic) development.
The most well known instance of this relates to the attempted
construction of the Jonglei Canal in southern Sudan. The ambition
behind this project was, and for some remains, to avoid evapo-
transpiration losses from the Nile by circumventing the Sudd
swamps, and through so doing increasing Nile ﬂow by up to 7 bm3/
year – this volume to be shared equally between Sudan and Egypt
(Ahmad, 2008, p. 578). Construction of the Canal started in 1978,
and it soon became clear that promises made by the Sudanese and
Egyptian authorities for community water supply projects
alongside it were not being kept (Johnson, 2003, p. 48), while
the Canal’s construction was disrupting livelihoods and wildlifeand cattle migration routes, causing signiﬁcant resentment
amongst the southern Sudanese, especially the cattle-herding
Dinka, who saw the project as typifying Khartoum’s policies of
exploitation and neglect (Collins, 1988, p. 152; Lako, 1988).
Indicative of this, the excavation machine used for digging the
Canal was targeted by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army at the
onset of Sudan’s second civil war. While this choice of target should
not be interpreted as evidence that Sudan’s second civil war was
essentially hydro-political in its causes – oil installations were also
targeted – it nonetheless encapsulates the intimate links that do
exist between water development and conﬂict in Sudan.
Dam construction projects and irrigation schemes have also
repeatedly led to displacement, dispossession and, in turn, political
and sometimes violent conﬂict. The establishment of the Ghezira
and Mangali schemes in the early nineteenth century gradually
transformed a population of half a million into tenant farmers and
wage labourers, this process involving the forced, and often
violent, appropriation of common land, labour and water (Barnett,
1977; Beer, 1955, p. 44). 80,000 were displaced during the 1960s
construction of the Roseries I Dam (Taha, 2010, p. 198), and a
further 100,000 by the Aswan High Dam/Wadi Haifa project,
leading to protests which continue to this day (Taha, 2010, p. 195).
More recently, the construction of the Merowe Dam has involved
the displacement of 50–70,000 (Sudan Tribune, 2008), and the
recently completed heightening of the Roseries Dam in Blue Nile
State is said to have displaced 22,000 families (Raziq, 2012).
Ensuing protests have been violently suppressed in both cases
(Abbas, 2012; Sudan Tribune, 2011).
Such examples pale into insigniﬁcance, however, relative to the
widespread and near continuous violence which has raged across
Sudan’s semi-periphery since the 1980s, associated with access to
and the development of rain-fed agricultural land. Sudan’s ﬁrst
civil war (1955–1972) was conﬁned to the South, and was
essentially rooted in political disagreements and objectives
relating to the constitutional structure of the newly independent
state. By contrast, Sudan’s second civil war – or what subsequently
became a network of multiple internal wars – has involved ﬁghting
in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, Kassala and Red Sea states, all
parts of the ‘Muslim North’. The post-2003 war in Darfur also ﬁts
into this category. These multiple conﬂicts have mainly been in
‘intermediate’ regions – that is, in areas which are politically and
economically semi-peripheral, lying neither in Sudan’s Northern
Nile state heartlands nor in the Southern periphery; and which are
mostly also ecologically transitional, lying between the Sahara to
the north and the equatorial zone to the south. The fundamental
reason for this geographical shift is that resource appropriation has
been a central cause and objective of the multiple wars witnessed
in Sudan since the 1980s, but was not a central cause of the ﬁrst
civil war; and that it has been in Sudan’s semi-periphery ‘where
asset transfer’ – especially the appropriation of rain-fed land – ‘has
been most marked’ (Johnson, 2003, p. 145).
Nowhere have these dynamics been more in evidence than in
the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan. The Nuba Mountains
region and their majority Nuba population have long been targeted
by the Sudanese state and reverine elite, both on ethnic-cultural
grounds, and with an eye to the appropriation of rain-fed
agricultural land for cotton production. This reached its height
in the early 1990s when an estimated 20–30,000 Nuba were
deported to resettlement camps known as ‘peace villages’, and
forced to work in large-scale mechanised farming schemes (Salih,
1995, p. 76), their appropriated land then being auctioned to Arab
businesses and settlers by the Sudanese Ministry of Planning
(Johnson, 2003, p. 133). Here, as elsewhere in Sudan’s semi-
periphery, it has been relative abundance rather than scarcity
which has been most consistently associated with conﬂict. As
Johnson notes, ‘[i]t has been one of the major ironies of the war that
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southern Sudan as a whole – be it in land, livestock, water, oil or
minerals – has been the source of their vulnerability’ (Johnson,
2003, p. 75; Keen, 2008).
It is not just this wealth and availability of resources that has
driven this pattern of violence, however, but also an underlying
political economic regime. In Sudan, this regime was established
by General Nimery’s 1970s ‘inﬁtah’ economic liberalisation
policies (Elnur, 2008, p. 40), which opened the door to Arab Gulf
petro-dollars, in turn providing the capital for an expansion of
mechanised farming under the supervision of the IMF and World
Bank. From then onwards, cultivating export-oriented crops
beyond the traditional Nile state cotton plantations, and becoming
‘Africa’s Breadbasket’, became central to Sudan’s development
policy. Politically this was sustained by simultaneous processes of
centralization, especially through the abolition of colonial ‘Native
Administrations’, and the commoditization of communal land
through the 1971 Unregistered Land Act. Built on the three pillars
of Arab ﬁnance, Western know-how and Sudanese resources, this
globalised process (Ayers, 2010) of ‘accumulation by disposses-
sion’ of traditional forms of subsistence (Abdelkarim, 1992; cf.
Harvey, 2009) led to a constant but unsustainable agricultural
expansion that depleted soils and other resources (Suliman, 1997),
and fuelled the local conﬂicts discussed above. As Verhoeven
(2011b) and others have point out, this developmental regime
continues to be reformulated by successive Sudanese governments
to this day. It deserves emphasising, though, that the reproduction
of this developmental regime is not only a product of elite strategy,
but is tightly wedded into, and determined by, processes of global
accumulation (Ayers, 2010, 2013).
The linkages between abundance, development and conﬂict in
Sudan are not speciﬁc to its post-colonial history, however: they
have a very long historical lineage. Relative water abundance was a
key motivation behind the Anglo-Egyptian colonisation of Sudan in
the 1890s. Egyptian cotton production, so crucial to British textile
production and the imperial economy, was dependent upon and
limited by summer Nile ﬂows – which could not be further
controlled or increased from within the borders of Egypt. Water
development upstream of Egypt, and just as importantly the
monitoring of irregular Nile ﬂows, thus became crucial to imperial
strategy. Recognising this, Cromer characterised ‘the effective
control of the waters of the Nile from the Equatorial Lakes to the
sea’ as a central motive behind the occupation of Sudan (Cromer,
1908). Indeed, while interpretations vary, some have characterised
the British colonisation of Sudan as ‘essentially hydrological’ in its
aims (Tvedt, 2011, p. 174, also: 2004). Whether this is the case or
not, the linkages here between water abundance, development and
political violence are beyond doubt. Kitchener’s military cam-
paigns up the Nile – culminating in the ‘battle’ of Omdurman, at
which 11,000 Sudanese were slaughtered, against only 49 Anglo-
Egyptian losses (Holt and Daly, 2000, p. 96; Lindqvist, 1996, p. 46) –
and the subsequent half-century of Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule in
Sudan were either partially or primarily rooted in hydro-political
ambitions. From the colonial era to the present, the links between
water abundance, water development and violent conﬂict have
been a recurrent theme of Sudanese politics.
7. Conclusions
We can now revisit our six hypotheses in light of the foregoing.
So, ﬁrst: it is clear that, at least geographically, conﬂict in the
Sudans has been more intimately associated with local environ-
mental abundance than with scarcity. The location of water and
rain-fed agriculture-related conﬂicts in the Sudd, in the Nuba
Mountains, across Sudan’s semi-periphery as a whole, and indeed
during the Anglo-Egyptian colonisation of Sudan all testify that thegeography of water abundance has had longstanding and enduring
impacts on the geography of conﬂict in the Sudans. Temporally, no
equivalent scale linkages exist – for the simple reason that no new
water resources have been created or discovered. At communal
levels, there is some evidence that the drilling of new boreholes by
aid agencies and NGOs regularly leads to conﬂict over newly
abundant waters (Workshop, 2012). By contrast, at a more macro-
level, the one change in water availability that can plausibly be
linked to conﬂict relates not to abundance, but to scarcity. The
Sahel drought of the 1970s and ‘80s left a bitter social and
economic legacy that arguably culminated, twenty years later, in
the 2003–2005 war. But by comparison with the direct evidence of
abundance-related violence, the linkages here are indirect, time-
lagged and in any case contestable. In the Sudans, conﬂict has been
much more directly linked to water abundance than to water
scarcity.
Secondly, however, this does not mean that these conﬂicts were
caused by ‘abundance’ – since local abundance only assumes
importance, and only exists, relative to ‘scarcities’ elsewhere. The
Jonglei Canal was an attempt to capture the abundant resources of
the Sudd on behalf of agricultural interests in the Upper Nile Valley,
and to this extent was as much about (visions of) scarcity in Cairo
and Khartoum as it was about abundance to the south. For
Kitchener’s campaign up the Nile, the same applies (though with
the qualiﬁcation that the aims of this campaign were probably only
in part hydrological). In this regard water is no different from
diamonds or oil: all resource-related conﬂicts revolve around the
relations between scarcity and abundance – ‘scarcity-abundance’ –
and are never about one or the other of these ‘variables’ treated in
isolation. The existing quantitative literature on environmental
and resource conﬂicts is profoundly mistaken in treating them as
such.
Notwithstanding the above, thirdly, the importance of these
water-related conﬂicts should not be over-stated: water, and the
political and economic relations associated with it, have not been
the primary drivers of conﬂict in the Sudans. Oil is much more
important to the two countries’ political economies, accounting, in
the South, for 98% of government revenues (Patey, 2010). Oil
wealth sharing provisions were central to the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement. And in turn, since the South’s 2011 secession, oil
has been the major source of North–South political and military
confrontation, leading for much of 2012 to a full-scale shut-down
of Southern oil production. Water, by contrast, is generally not a
route to substantial wealth and power. It barely ﬁgured within the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Rolandsen, 2011, p. 558). There
have been no signiﬁcant post-secession disputes over water-
sharing. And there is little sign of any such disputes coming to pass.
The central reason for this is that, within the context of
contemporary global capitalism, water is not a source of signiﬁcant
rents, or in turn a signiﬁcant part of the armoury of state and elite
power.
Fourthly, political economic dynamics, rather than changes in
resource availability, have been the main proximate determinants
of environment-related conﬂict in the Sudans. The construction of
the Jonglei Canal was determined not by any sudden or secular
scarcity, but by political changes in Khartoum. Likewise, land
appropriation in the Nuba Mountains was not a response to
emerging land shortages, but was rather part of a state-led project
of expanding mechanised agriculture, and of ‘accumulation by
dispossession’ (Harvey, 2009). In both cases, environment-related
conﬂict occurred in the absence of, or irrespective of, environmen-
tal change. The latter is neither a sufﬁcient, nor even a necessary,
condition for environment-related violence.
Rather than environmental change, it is political economic
factors which have been the main determinants of water-related
violence in the Sudans. These factors have been at once local,
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down the Nile, resulting in the Sudan’s forcible integration into the
then British-dominated world economy, and in turn to the
hydraulic development and violent transformation of its central
riverine states. Egyptian-Sudanese collaboration lay behind the
Jonglei Canal. And the more recent water and land-related conﬂicts
across Sudan’s semi-periphery have all been determined by
political economic factors: by the global turn to neo-liberalism
from the 1970s onwards; by Sudan’s extreme indebtedness; by the
inﬂuence of the World Bank and IMF; by the oil boom of the 1970s
and ‘80s; and, not least, by the interests of Khartoum’s elites and its
liberalising but military regime. If representative, this suggests
that it is local but globally-embedded political economic processes
– simultaneously processes of development and state-building –
which are the key to understanding environment-conﬂict relations
in peripheral states like the Sudans.
To what extent might these ﬁndings hold true, and to what extent
might this model still apply, under circumstances of global climate
change? Global Circulation Model projections offer little clear
guidance: while on average they suggest small precipitation
increases across most of Sudan and South Sudan, individual Global
Circulation Model projections diverge strongly (for example,
individual projections for Nyala in Darfur for the period 2040–
2069, suggest anywhere from a 21% increase in precipitation to a 25%
decrease: Bruggeman et al., 2010, p. 41). Indeed, the only changes
that can be predicted with any degree of conﬁdence are that
temperatures will rise, perhaps by up to 2.5 8C by 2040–2069
(Bruggeman et al., 2010, p. 20), in turn increasing evapo-transpira-
tion losses; and that there will be an increased incidence of
precipitation extremes. Other changes are also likely, including
further increases in water demand stemming from population
growth and agricultural development, both internally within Sudan
and elsewhere in the Nile basin (especially in Egypt and Ethiopia).
But the potential impact of these should not be overstated. Yes,
Ethiopia has ambitious water development plans, but these do not
involve large net increases in water abstraction: the main purpose of
its dam-building is electricity generation, not irrigation (el Hatow,
2012); and increased water storage in the Ethiopian highlands could
conceivably lead, within the context of an integrated basin-wide
regime, to signiﬁcant savings from the 10 bm3/year evaporation
currently lost from Lake Nasser (Cheterian, 2012; Verhoeven, 2011a,
p. 12). And yes, the Nile basin’s total population may grow by as
much as 53% by 2030 (UN, 2012), but continuing urbanisation will
likely moderate the impacts of this on rural livelihoods. Nile
riparians already rely on virtual water imports more than they do on
the Nile itself (Zeitoun et al., 2010), and could make even greater use
of such imports. The Nile is not inexorably becoming a site of
scarcity, let alone scarcity-induced conﬂict.
What will determine future patterns of environment-related
conﬂict in the Sudans is not so much the level of the Nile, nor
climate change, but the two countries’ political economies, the
strategies adopted by local elites, and the global dynamics in which
these are embedded. The loss of up to 75% of Sudan’s hydro-carbon
income following southern secession will require nothing short of
a re-invention of the Sudanese economy (Verjee, 2012). Sudan
currently faces high unemployment rates, a high public deﬁcit,
high inﬂation rates and high international debt, currently
combined with an internationally-monitored austerity pro-
gramme (ADBG, 2013). Military expenditure also remains high,
reﬂecting the continuing conﬂicts in Darfur, Abyei, Blue Nile and
South Kordofan, and the military basis of the Khartoum regime. As
in the past, this situation could well inspire aggressive state
strategies, including the violent appropriation of land and water.
In South Sudan, equally, oil and donor dependency, the size of
the security sector (accounting for 40% of government spending)
and large-scale internal violence, including periodic militaryengagements with the North, are such that it is hard to imagine
that South Sudan’s future will be anything but conﬂict-laden. Water
may quite conceivably be part of this. While historical experience
has made water development schemes politically sensitive, even the
Jonglei Canal is not rejected on principle by the South Sudanese
leadership (Ahmad, 2008; Sudan Tribune, 2009; Interview, 2011a);
and Egypt continues to express its interest in the realisation of the
project (Sullivan and Nasrallah, 2010, p. 11; Taha, 2010). Moreover,
increased agricultural production has already been singled out as
one of the cornerstones of the future South Sudanese economy
(GRSS, 2011), which will increase the conﬂict potential of water-rich
land (UNHCR, 2012), not least if these become sites of ‘land grabs’ by
foreign investors (Deng, 2011). Any of these developments could
have violent consequences.
More generally, there is no reason to suppose that climate
change will lead to a reversal of the dynamics described above –
either in the Sudans or elsewhere. The capture of relatively
abundant resources, linked to processes of internal colonisation
and economic development, will likely continue to be a cause of
conﬂict in the global periphery. Indeed, one implication of the
above is that state strengthening and economic development –
routinely advocated by international development actors as the
main ways of mitigating resource scarcities, and building adaptive
capacities – may signiﬁcantly exacerbate patterns of environment-
related conﬂict (Verhoeven, 2011b). If this is indeed correct, then
the main conﬂict risk posed by climate change in contexts like the
Sudans might not be increased scarcity, but rather renewed
patterns of exploitation and appropriation informed – or
legitimised – by new discourses of climate crisis.
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